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Aesthetics has played an influential role in how we ascribe value to the environment.
Yet, it seems that if we are to take the beauty of the natural world seriously, certain
aesthetics judgments must be better than others. The scientific cognitive model posits that
the natural world must be interpreted through an understanding of biological and
geological categories, which are provided by scientific knowledge and common sense.
While there are clearly merits to this model, it is not without its own set of problems and
limitations. These problems exist in both the model itself and with its extension to
environmental ethics. This thesis functions as an analysis and critique of this particular
model, suggesting that it should not be thought of as comprehensive in both a descriptive
and a normative sense, nor relied on exclusively for environmental decision making. I
suggest two other models of aesthetic appreciation that can and should exist alongside the
scientific cognitive model, eventually settling on a position of constrained pluralism.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface: Why an Aesthetics of the Natural Environment Matters......................................1
Introduction: An Overview of the Project.........................................................................4
Chapter One: The Scientific Cognitive Model of Aesthetic Appreciation......................11
Chapter Two: Ethical Implications of the Scientific Cognitive Model...........................21
Chapter Three: Re-examining the Scientific Cognitive Model.......................................29
Chapter Four: Further Problems for the Scientific Cognitive Model..............................40
Chapter Five: The Move to Constrained Pluralism.........................................................49
Conclusion........................................................................................................................58
Notes..................................................................................................................................60

iii

Preface: Why an Aesthetics of the Natural Environment Matters

Beauty is one of the things we value most in this world. The aesthetic imperative,
which has us preserve something on account of its beauty, arises both naturally and
readily. It is used to warrant the protection of many things, from art to architecture to
natural environments. There are many reasons why we value the natural world, and
aesthetic reasons are some of the most important among them. A sense of the beauty of
the natural world has played a crucial role in motivating a shift towards valuing nature
non-instrumentally, instead of merely as a resource to be exploited. Aesthetics has shaped
environmental policy from the very beginning and continues to shape it in more ways
than we might imagine. Traditionally, aesthetics has played a predominant role in
environmental preservation. The work of Muir and Burroughs, whose approaches can be
largely categorized as aesthetic, strongly influenced the development of the
environmental movement. In The Yosemite, Muir wrote, “Everybody needs beauty as
well as bread...where nature may heal and give strength to body and soul alike”.1
Evaluations such as theirs have shaped policy and management in North America from
the beginning of the twentieth century, particularly in management of national parks and
wilderness areas. When we consider which places to save, which to protect, which to
restore, or which to use for other purposes, the beauty of the landscape is often a
significant factor in these determinations.
Aside from its predominant role in preservation efforts, there is a more
fundamental way in which the aesthetic experience incorporates itself in our relation to
the natural world. Whatever our reasons for enjoying nature and working to serve and

protect it, an aesthetic response frequently underpins much of our motivation. Our
primary means of experiencing the world around us is visual, and so it should come as no
surprise that at least some of our initial valuation relates directly to the primacy of this
sense. When we confront the world, judgments of taste or beauty are some of the most
fundamental reactions we have. We all have an aesthetic reaction to the environment
around us, and there is a very real sense in which this reaction can motivate and guide an
appreciation. This reaction is common in both the most seasoned naturalist and the most
secluded city dweller, albeit to varying degrees and with differing foci. Given that the
aesthetic experience is foundational, pervasive, and influential, it is one we should take
seriously.
From the recognition that aesthetics has played a significant role in our
relationship and valuation of the environment comes the normative question of what an
aesthetics of the natural world should be. It seems that if aesthetics is going to shape an
environmental ethic it must be of a certain kind. There is a sense in which everything in
the world is subject to aesthetic appreciation, but this clearly won’t be helpful when
aesthetics is meant to justify our protection of the natural world. For aesthetics to be a
useful tool for environmentalism, certain aesthetic judgments must be better than others.
There needs to be a certain level of objectivity in our evaluations, and these evaluations
should be deep and serious rather than superficial. An aesthetic that is deep and serious
goes beneath the surface of an object and is adequately informed by an appropriate
understanding of the natural world. Furthermore, it should be based on more than the
subjective whims of the viewer, who may or may not be an appropriate judge of aesthetic
qualities. Janna Thompson explains it the following way:
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The link... between aesthetic judgment and ethical obligation fails unless there are
objective grounds - grounds that rational, sensitive people can accept - for
thinking that something has value. If beauty in nature... is merely in the eye of the
beholder, then no general moral obligation arises out of aesthetic judgment. A
judgment of value that is merely personal and subjective gives us no way of
arguing that everyone ought to learn to appreciate something, or at least to regard
it as worthy of preservation.2
The question of objectivity is at once a question of guidance, and there is a sense in
which in order to have guidance, a certain degree of objectivity must be maintained.
Without any objectivity, aesthetic taste becomes entirely subjective and arbitrary, which
is particularly problematic if it is going to aid preservation efforts. To connect aesthetic
value to environmental thought and action requires a guidance which in a sense limits the
aesthetic experience, but in another sense enriches it. Just how much guidance and
objectivity is required is a significant debate among aestheticians of the natural world.
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Introduction: An Overview of the Project

This thesis will examine one particular model of aesthetic appreciation put forth
by Allen Carlson known as the natural environmental model or more generally, the
scientific cognitive model. The model will not only be considered in the general realm of
aesthetics, but also in its application to ethical obligation and environmental decision
making. By this I mean protection, preservation, and other related environmental
management decisions in which beauty might be a factor. When I talk about the
extension to environmental ethics, I have these kind of decisions in mind, all of which
depend upon the recognition of value in the natural world. I will consider the model
beyond the way in which it is put forth by Carlson himself, looking at how it is utilized
by other aestheticians, both in the aesthetic experience and in the extension to ethics. I
will point to some of the inherent problems in Carlson’s model, although much of my
critique will focus on how the model is used. While there are clearly merits to Carlson’s
model, I will ultimately argue that it should not be considered comprehensive.
In place of an exclusive model, I am going to recommend a pluralistic approach to
environmental aesthetics. As to whether Carlson wholeheartedly supports a pluralistic
model himself isn’t exactly clear. He is concerned with an aesthetics of nature that
addresses “fundamental issues about the nature of the natural world and our place in it,”
suggesting that models that deal most directly with this issue deserve most of our
consideration.3 He believes science is best at addressing these issues, and so the scientific
cognitive model should maintain a particular centrality in the midst of other models.
What the issues are that Carlson alludes to are not exactly clear, nor is the explanation for
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why science is the best means for achieving them. The extent to which he believes other
models can and should exist alongside, supporting his own, remains ambiguous. There
are others such as Marcia Eaton, however, who believe the scientific cognitive model
should be relied on exclusively if aesthetics is going to inform our environmental
decision making. Marcia Eaton puts it the following way:
...if we want to develop a basis for rational evaluation of a landscape's ecological
sustainability, I am convinced that we must stress the cognitive. A patch of purple
loosestrife, with its brilliant color, may cause a lot of pleasure... A large expanse
of closely clipped, deep-green grass may cause soothing flights of imagination.
But all of these objects threaten certain biosystems, and only someone whose
aesthetic response is based on knowledge will act in ways that are sustainable
ecologically and, ultimately, aesthetically.4
In other words, only an environmental aesthetic informed by environmental knowledge
should be the foundation for ethical obligations based on this type of value. Eaton admits
that other factors such as imagination and emotion can factor into our experience of
nature, but that they are unable to provide a deep and meaningful foundation on which
the aesthetic response can rest. While she may not completely disregard all other types of
aesthetic responses, she clearly believes only one that is driven by scientific knowledge
can create the extension from aesthetics to ethics. Eaton, and perhaps Carlson, seem to
believe other models should defer to a comprehensive, scientific cognitive model,
allowing scientific knowledge to serve as the final arbiter in our aesthetic judgments. This
is the view I will be calling into question. Thus, I will not be arguing against Carlson in
this regard, but only against the notion that his model should be relied on exclusively,
which is an issue separate and irrelevant to the extent that Carlson himself embraces this
notion.
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It is true that aesthetic value cannot be entirely subjective if it is going to play a
role in environmental decision making. However, scientific knowledge is not the only
way to achieve a more objective aesthetic. Other models such as Noel Carroll’s emotionbased model and Emily Brady’s imagination-based model can also offer an appropriate
level of objectivity. In this regard I will support Ned Hettinger’s constrained pluralism of
aesthetic models and show how other models can and should exist alongside the
scientific-cognitive. These other models do maintain a degree of objectivity that is
needed in order to guide our aesthetic judgments. Carlson’s model should be embraced,
but not exclusively. To weaken the model’s strict dominance in the realm of aesthetics of
the natural world, my approach will be twofold. First, I will point out the problems
inherent in the scientific cognitive model and show why the extension to ethics can be
accomplished in other ways. To rely exclusively on this model is to place too much
limitation on the aesthetic experience and diminish the support aesthetic value may lend
our duty to protect the natural world. Second, I will show how objectivity can be
maintained through other models of aesthetic appreciation and how these models can still
provide the guidance and depth required of an environmental aesthetic.
In the first section, I will introduce the scientific cognitive model itself and situate
it in the realm of environmental aesthetics. I will look at two other models of aesthetic
appreciation, the object and landscape models, showing how they are problematic. I will
look at how the scientific cognitive model offers a better alternative, providing an
aesthetic that considers the environment at large. I will examine Carlson’s development
of this model as an extension of Kendall Walton’s categorical interpretation from art to
the natural environment. This will serve to establish the objectivity in Carlson’s model,
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allowing for correct and incorrect and better and worse aesthetic responses. I will then
point to the more general aesthetic this model supports, one that regards an object of
appreciation as it actually is rather than what may or may not be perceived in it. I will
then look at how scientific knowledge can also direct our aesthetic experience in ways
that uncover a certain depth and seriousness that may have otherwise been missed in the
absence of such relevant knowledge.
In the second section, I will discuss the ethical implications contained not only in
the model itself, but in its extension to environmental policy and management. I will
continue to examine the underlying normative assumption that we should appreciate
nature as it in fact is rather than as what it may appear to be. I will look at how
categorical knowledge provided by science shapes the aesthetic experience in ways that
have ethical significance. I will look at Sheila Lintott’s notion of an ecofriendly aesthetic
and how scientific knowledge factors into its achievement. I will consider how Carlson’s
model contributes to designing sustainable landscapes and examine the notion of aligning
beauty with ecological health. Embedded in this discussion is an instrumental view of
environmental aesthetics that justifies the positive relationship between appreciation and
environmental protection. Scientific cognitivism underlies the aesthetic notions of Lintott
and Eaton, as they both see science as a useful tool for bringing beauty and ecological
health5 together. I will discuss this idea in order to later show why science may not
always be so useful in making these determinations.
In the third section, I will examine the strengths of the scientific cognitive model
more closely and begin to consider other alternatives. I will look at other ways of moving
beyond a superficial aesthetic that can work to thicken or deepen our aesthetic
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appreciation of nature without relying on scientific knowledge. These other approaches
are still cognitive, but stress cultural and historical knowledge rather than merely the
scientific. I will consider how the humanization and cultivation that qualifies these
responses may also be present in the scientific cognitive model, questioning the concept
of appreciating nature as nature. I will then reexamine the aesthetic experience itself by
returning to Walton’s categorical interpretation in order to show how scientific
knowledge need not entirely form our aesthetic experience for it to be appropriate and
meaningful. To do this, I will draw upon Nick Zangwill’s concept of cross-category
judgment to show that part of the aesthetic experience exists outside of category
attributions. This will provide the ground for suggesting that categories are not the only
means of gaining a meaningful and objective aesthetic response. This section will
question the strengths and highlight the limitations of the scientific cognitive model and
will show why it should exist alongside other models of appreciation and not be
considered the only useful model in the extension to ethics.
In the fourth section, I will continue to find limitations with the scientific
cognitive model in order to eventually question the notion that only an environmental
aesthetic informed by environmental knowledge is one that can lead to sustainable care
and protectionism. I will examine the values we ascribe to the natural environment and
how beauty functions in our preservation efforts. I will show how the neutrality of
scientific knowledge creates a significant problem for the coordination of beauty and
ecological health. In other words, it isn’t clear how an aesthetic based on scientific
knowledge should direct us to an environmental ethic. This will be pointed out not to
diminish the role of aesthetics in environmentalism, but mainly to show that other values
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ultimately steer our policies in a way that should allow for other types of aesthetic
experiences. I will ultimately argue that the aesthetic response can be useful in the
extension to ethics not in the direct guidance it offers to environmental policy, but in the
value it bestows upon an environment. This value can then be assessed alongside other
ecological values, such as health and sustainability, in order to guide environmental
policy. To illustrate this I will examine how scientific knowledge operates in our
appreciation of beauty in two problematic cases: spotted knapweed (an invasive species)
and a sunset affected by pollution.
Having pointed out some of the weaknesses of the scientific cognitive model and
having questioned how scientific knowledge functions with the extension to ethics, I will
introduce Hettinger’s idea of constrained pluralism in the last section. I will examine how
objectivity can still be maintained in other models, particularly Noel Carroll’s emotionbased arousal model and Emily Brady’s imagination-based model. I will argue that these
other models can and should exist beside the scientific cognitive model in order to
provide a more complete aesthetic experience. This in turn will be able to accomplish
more for environmentalism by providing additional rationale for preservation efforts. I
will show how this rationale is not arbitrary, given that it not only offers a certain depth
in the experience, but that this depth is open to an appraisal that is both cognitive and
objective. The kind of aesthetic objectivity gained in these models, though different,
should be thought no less meaningful as that provided by the sciences. This notion should
be embraced based not only on my prior critique of the scientific cognitive model’s own
claim to objectivity, but also through an examination of how objectivity functions in
these models. Objectivity is not based on categories with these models, but rather on
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alternative accounts of reasonability and justification that have to do with the
appropriateness of an emotion or the imagination in a particular context. With appropriate
usage, these other models should be able to provide additional support for our ethical
obligation to the natural world and subsequent policy and management decisions.
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I: The Scientific Cognitive Model of Aesthetic Appreciation

Knowledge of what to appreciate in the natural environment and how to
appreciate it is perhaps less straightforward than knowledge as it relates to art.
Traditionally, environmental aesthetics has consisted of a transference of sorts, where
artistic paradigms are simply applied to the environment. The two most notable
paradigms in this regard have been the object and landscape models of aesthetic
appreciation. The object model entails abstracting a physical object from its environment
and appreciating it as one might appreciate a sculpture, paying attention to the actual
physical qualities of the object itself. These qualities are contained entirely in the object
of inspection and need not relate to anything outside it, namely, its surroundings. For
instance, one may look upon the sensuous qualities of a piece of limestone, noting its
form, color, shape, etc, treating it as one would a sculpture. Objects viewed this way are
completely abstracted from their environments with no representational tie to reality.
The landscape model of aesthetic appreciation entails viewing the environment as
one might in composing a landscape painting. Visual qualities that constitute the
environment are typically those which lend it the kind of aesthetic evaluation one would
encounter in a landscape painting or a postcard. This model is grounded in the concept of
the picturesque and cultivation of the scenic viewpoint. This is probably the most natural
and common type of environmental aesthetic, one whose presence we cannot escape
when thinking about beauty in nature. According to Carlson, there are both ethical and
aesthetic reasons for finding these models objectionable. Here I shall briefly mention the
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latter, before moving on to discuss what Carlson sees as the most plausible paradigm, the
scientific cognitive model.
The main problem with the object model of aesthetic appreciation is that it
profoundly limits the character of the aesthetic experience. To show why this is the case
requires making the distinction between nature and the objects of nature. With the object
model we are relegated to the latter and are unable to exercise a more indeterminate
aesthetic judgment that concerns nature as a whole. When we remove objects from their
natural surroundings we lose an important, immersive part of the aesthetic experience
that acknowledges our presence in nature. Removing objects also limits appreciation to
sensuous and expressive qualities, with no regard for the environment in which they are
naturally displayed. Carlson rightly points out, these objects are contained in and have
developed from the elements and forces contained in the environment, and to ignore these
elements would be to neglect a large part of what constitutes the object’s aesthetic
character. Qualities found in a piece of driftwood are the product of the object’s
relationship with the environment. For instance, its smoothness represents the force of the
ocean as well as a sense of time. Abstracting objects in nature and appreciating them as
though they were a sculpture robs one of a more nuanced appreciation that observes the
environment in which natural objects are both found and constituted.
The landscape model is problematic as well, forcing us to view the environment
in scenes that are both static and alienated from their proper context. By reducing the
environment to a scene or view, this model requires one to create a two-dimensional
impression of the natural world. Framing a scene in nature as one would a painting or
photograph severely limits the type of aesthetic experience one might have. Not only
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does this model limit our appreciation to visual qualities related to the framing of a
landscape, but it can mislead us as well. Focusing merely on what is picturesque would
have us neglect a great deal of experiences of the natural world that might otherwise be
considered aesthetic. So much of nature does not fall under the category of the
picturesque, but there are still many reasons for its aesthetic appreciation. Our obsession
with scenery also has ecological ramifications, which we will come to later on. Carlson’s
main concern with the landscape model is that it requires an appreciation that does not
regard the environment as it actually is, but rather as something it is not. The
environment itself is not a landscape painting, and to view it as such would be to ignore
the nature of the natural environment. The object model suffers from a similar neglect,
and the failure of the two has Carlson seek a model that truly takes the natural
environment into account.
Rather than an aesthetic that merely takes objects into account, Carlson wants to
consider a broader concept which observes the environment at large. The consummatory
experience of the natural environment must influence our aesthetic experience, but if it is
to do so, it must be ordered and interpreted in a certain way. The recognition and
distinction of certain aspects of the environment as foci of aesthetic appreciation seems
necessary if we are to have an experience that is not overwhelming or confusing. Carlson
suggests there are natural foci that are appropriate to each environment, where
appropriate knowledge constructs limits and boundaries in the experience. In the case of
the natural environment, the knowledge that is relevant in providing these appropriate
limits is provided by science and common sense. Scientific knowledge becomes a tool for
what and how to appreciate nature, granting us appropriate foci in the natural world for
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the aesthetic significance. This notion is what forms the basis of the scientific cognitive
model, the foundation of which can be traced to Kendall Walton’s Categories of Art.
Carlson’s first task is to show that relevant knowledge of an object in nature can
change our aesthetic appreciation of it by changing how we perceive it. He seeks a nonrelative, objective view of aesthetic judgment, which regards the object (nature) as it
actually is. To do this he creates an account of aesthetics with nature analogous to
Walton’s account of aesthetics with art. Walton’s position represents the anti-formalist
view of aesthetics, where aesthetic characteristics are contextual and/or representative.
This means they are assessed within the context in which the representations are made,
historical or otherwise, as well as with regard to the things in the world they actually
represent. This position is contrasted to the formalist position, which places emphasis on
the compositional elements of art (its form and visual aspects), without any reliance on
outside knowledge. Walton wants to get rid of the notion that works of art should be
judged simply by what can be perceived in them. He does not mean to suggest that the
appearance of art is inconsequential, but merely that it must be judged in light of its
contextual or cognitive counterpart. A work’s aesthetic properties depend upon its nonaesthetic properties, where relevant knowledge about a work can change our aesthetic
appreciation. For Walton, aesthetic judgments are best understood in terms of categories,
and it is in this interpretation that we encounter objectivity in art. The rightness and
wrongness of an aesthetic judgment depends upon correct category identification and not
merely upon the viewer’s discretion.
The category in which a work is perceived clearly affects one’s aesthetic
judgment of it. Categories function to give a better determination of what a perceived
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object is, which then affects what aesthetic properties the object has. They guide our
aesthetic appreciation by supplying standards that direct the way we see an object.
Walton uses Picasso’s Guernica as an example, where perceptible qualities that render an
aesthetic judgment true or false are based in the category in which the painting belongs.
In the case of Guernica this would be the category of cubist painting. If Guernica were
perceived differently, say as though it were a realist painting, statements of form and
representation (from the standpoint of a realist painting) would likely be inappropriate.
For instance, in failing to place Guernica in the category of cubist painting, one might see
it as awkward, inaccurate, exaggerated, etc.
Walton refers to three kinds of perceptible qualities: the standard, contra-standard,
and variable. If Guernica is perceived as a cubist painting, its cube-like shapes and
exaggerated forms will be perceived as standard; yet, if it is perceived as a realist
painting, these same shapes and forms may be perceived as contra-standard or variable.
The reason this is important is that not only is the truth value of aesthetic judgments
affected by non-aesthetic qualities, but by whether or not the work is perceived in its
correct category. Perceiving a work in its correct category entails knowledge of the
category itself (its history, characteristics, etc), as well as knowledge of how to perceive a
work in this category.6 This, of course, requires more than reliance on the senses. This
knowledge is the type gained by familiarity with art and art history, and so is perhaps best
provided by the art critic or historian. Correct aesthetic appreciation demands knowledge
of the relevant non-aesthetic qualities. In other words, there is a strong cognitive piece to
the experience.
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Aestheticians like Allen Carlson want to extend this interpretation to the natural
world. Non-aesthetic properties of objects in nature that are informed by cognition can
affect the aesthetic experience. In the case of nature, knowledge of these properties is
provided by the natural sciences, the categories of which function in an analogous way to
nature as art historical categories do to art. In transferring the category interpretation to
the aesthetic appreciation of nature, Carlson asserts that the perceptions of certain
categories of nature are correct while others are not. Nature and art differ in the clear
sense that with the latter we can know about its origin and intent. Initially it seems we are
in a better position to judge art aesthetically based on this knowledge and the prescribed
intention of being perceived within a certain category. It is worth mentioning that Walton
himself believes his category interpretation applies only to art, and that in this sense we
are not really in a position to judge nature aesthetically. Carlson, however, believes the
analogy works, pointing to the existence of categories of nature.
Carlson argues that even though nature is not produced with the intent of
belonging to certain categories, as artworks are, we can inform our aesthetic appreciation
of it with a system of categories. Human production is not the only way that something
can come to belong to an aesthetically relevant category, and in the case of nature, it
stands to reason that such categories would be discovered rather than produced.7
Discovered factors are what make aspects of nature and natural objects fall under certain
categories. To make correct aesthetic judgments about nature requires knowing
something about what is appreciated. This knowledge is provided by the natural sciences
or common-sense, which create biological and geological categories. This knowledge
works in a similar manner as knowledge about art, allowing us to judge a work (or
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nature) in its appropriate context. With the scientific cognitive model, appreciating
something in nature in its correct category entails placing it in its correct biological or
geological category. Being able to place an object in its correct category allows us to
avoid aesthetic omissions and deceptions. By omissions I mean what is left out of the
aesthetic experience in the absence of relevant knowledge and by deceptions I mean the
certain mistakes that may be made in the absence of this knowledge. Without the relevant
knowledge and background of cubist paintings, one might see a Picasso as awkward,
exaggerated, etc. In nature, without a correct understanding of categories one might come
to find a moose as an awkward deer, if mistaken as such. These omissions and deceptions
are the type inherent in the object and landscape models and are avoidable in Carlson’s
scientific cognitive model.
The general aesthetic this model tends towards is one where aesthetic appreciation
is centered on and driven by nature itself, rather than our preconceived ideals or
abstraction of its elements. In order for this to happen nature must be composed at some
level and understood a certain way. The model suggests appreciation cannot be based on
preconceptions or ideals, as was the case with the object and landscape models, but rather
by the real nature of the object. Perception informed by scientific knowledge and
common sense allows for the kind of objectivity that can place aspects of nature in
correct categories and thus, ground appreciation in the real nature of the object. Scientific
knowledge and common sense come together in such a way that informs our experience,
making it both intelligible and meaningful. As Carlson puts it, “we must recognize the
smells of hay and horse dung and perhaps distinguish between them; we must feel the ant
at least as an insect rather than as, say, a twitch”.8 This is why Carlson talks about both
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scientific knowledge and common sense, for there is a way in which they are both
operative in our identification of the ant.
Carlson is ultimately concerned with the distinction between an aesthetic that is
trivial or superficial and one that is serious and deep. The seriousness and appropriateness
of the experience for Carlson depends on whether it captures objects “as they in fact are
and in light of knowledge of their real natures”.9 The former is attained by the correct
category identification, and in the case of nature, this entails recognizing it both as natural
and as an environment.10 Knowledge of an object’s real nature is, of course, best
provided by natural science and common sense, whether that object is one found in
nature or is nature itself. This general aesthetic (which applies to art as well) is one of the
primary normative assumptions that underlies the scientific cognitive model. Regarding
aesthetic models themselves more generally, there is a descriptive sense in which Carlson
admits to other types of aesthetic experiences. In other words, we may have other means
of finding beauty besides relying on scientific knowledge and cognition. However, these
other means usually tend to be more superficial or arbitrary, and there is a sense in which
to achieve the seriousness and depth required of an appropriate aesthetic experience we
should embrace his model. Therefore, the more general normative claim is that the
scientific cognitive model is what we should embrace if we are to take the beauty of the
natural world seriously.
In addition to aiding an appropriate aesthetic appreciation of the natural world,
scientific knowledge also affects the aesthetic experience in a more direct way, in many
cases helping to uncover its beauty. Carlson would contend that scientific knowledge
yields certain qualities in nature readily recognizable as aesthetic. “Scientific information

18

and redescription make us see beauty where we could not see it before, pattern and
harmony instead of meaningless jumble.”11 Scientific knowledge in this sense can
transform the natural world by helping us to perceive beauty. Holmes Rolston supports
this notion in the following way:
Ecological description finds unity, harmony, interdependence, stability, etc....12
earlier data are not denied, only re-described or set in a larger ecological context,
and somewhere en route our notions of harmony, stability, etc., have shifted too
and we see beauty now where we could not see it before.13
Science helps us uncover an aesthetic value that relies, in a sense, on correct, informed,
and relevant ecological knowledge. This knowledge provides foci of aesthetic
appreciation which uncover aspects of the natural world that may be considered aesthetic
when viewed appropriately. When viewing a tree, knowledge that pertains to its growth,
survival, physical features, age, type, ecological function, etc functions to enhance the
aesthetic experience. It provides for a depth of experience that would otherwise be absent
without this relevant knowledge. Viewing a tree as an oak with a host of qualities and
characteristics offers a better, more informed aesthetic experience than if the tree is
merely viewed as a tree, with no knowledge of how it fits into its environment and what
features it has. In order to appreciate what aesthetic qualities nature has, it is necessary to
know how it is should be viewed, for the qualities depend on how they are perceived.
Appropriate appreciation rests on perceiving objects of nature in their correct categories,
and only in doing so will we uncover the beauty we might otherwise not.
Carlson’s model gives us reasons for why knowledge plays an important role in
the aesthetic experience of nature. Additionally, it gives us normative reasons for why it
should. The underlying assumption of the scientific cognitive model is that aesthetic
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appreciation must be informed and directed to certain foci. Carlson believes knowledge
of the natural environment can provide the appropriate boundaries for the aesthetic
experience, informing not only what to appreciate, but how to appreciate as well.
Scientific knowledge can help us discover what is aesthetically relevant about nature by
focusing our attention on certain aspects. This model succeeds at lending aesthetics an
objectivity which seems to give aesthetic considerations more relevance and importance
in environmental assessment by grounding them in science rather than subjective whims.
Appreciation is centered on and driven by the object of appreciation itself rather than
preconceptions or ideals. As we will see, this model has ethical ramifications as well as
aesthetic.
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II: Ethical Implications of the Scientific Cognitive Model

Proponents of the scientific cognitive model regularly assert that if aesthetics is
going to influence environmental decisions, the aesthetic model must be of a certain kind.
In this section I examine why the scientific cognitive model is widely regarded as the
most appropriate model in aesthetics for providing support for environmentalism and
environmental decision making. I will start by examining how ethics is thought to
function in the aesthetic experience itself, as well as the general aesthetic of appreciating
an object as it actually is. I will then look at how the method of category interpretation
applies to the natural world as well as why the deeper kind of aesthetic the scientific
cognitive model enables can be useful for preservation efforts. Underlying this discussion
will be the notion of aligning beauty and ecological health, which some believe to be
possible only if our appreciation of beauty is informed by scientific knowledge.
One argument in favor of the scientific cognitive model is that an appropriate
aesthetic appreciation of the natural environment informed by scientific knowledge
guards against aesthetic omissions and deceptions. Such errors can have ecological
ramifications, perhaps most explicitly with the landscape model of aesthetic appreciation.
If we come to value nature that exhibits a picturesque aesthetic this may cause us to
preserve land that has little ecological value, while neglecting high value lands. Wetlands
and marshes do not contain aesthetic qualities associated with the picturesque and so may
often be exploited in favor of less ecologically important, but more scenic, land. Basing
an ecological ethic solely on notions of the picturesque cannot inform our environmental
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decision making, and if aesthetics is going to do work for environmentalism and
preservation, it must go deeper.
To show how ethics can often be wrapped up in the aesthetic experience let us
look at Berkeley Pit in Butte, MT. The Anaconda Copper Company began open pit
mining in Butte to extract copper from lower grade ore in 1955, when copper prices were
the highest they had been since World War I. In its years of operation, 316 million tons of
ore were mined from the Berkeley Pit. The Atlantic Richfield Company (ARCO)
operated the mine until 1982, when it was shut down due to continual declines in copper
prices. When the mine was closed the water pumps in the Kelly Shaft were turned off,
and groundwater from the surrounding aquifers began to fill the pit. The water, with
dissolved oxygen, allowed pyrite and sulfide minerals in the ore and wall rocks to decay,
releasing acid. This acidic water contains high levels of minerals and metals, such as
arsenic, cadmium, copper, zinc, calcium, magnesium, potassium, sodium, iron,
manganese, aluminum, chloride, fluoride, and sulfate. The pH of the Pit water is 2.5 to
3.0, and the existence of the aforementioned acids are what give the water its unique
color.14 It is possible to imagine a perspective from which one might appreciate the
unique red, orange, and yellow water color of Berkeley Pit. Without any knowledge of
what water should look like and what caused the water in Berkeley Pit to look that way,
we may easily regard it as beautiful. Yet, this aesthetic judgment is certainly affected
when scientific knowledge tells us the cause behind the coloration.
Categorical knowledge provided by science and common sense tells us what the
color of water should be, and so when water fails to fit into this standard category (which
identifies it as clear or blue, etc) this changes our aesthetic appreciation. Berkeley Pit
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must be judged in terms of its background and context, which are non-aesthetic qualities.
In this case these qualities have to do with the existence of heavy metals, their reason for
being there, as well as the effect these metals have on their environment. Knowledge of
the origin of the coloration of Berkeley Pit transforms our perception, and this perception
ultimately has ethical implications. These implications are ultimately derived from an
aesthetic experience that is morally engaged, which is the type Carlson and others seem
to be directing us towards. This is also the way in which Eaton and others believe the
scientific cognitive model provides an adequate foundation for environmental decision
making.
Carlson and many others believe aesthetic appreciation plays a significant role in
shaping and forming our ethical views. He believes that to keep the two in harmony we
must perceive an object in its correct category. This kind of appreciation is driven by the
object itself as it actually is. Carlson provides the example of the aesthetic appreciation
of a Playboy centerfold model. If we are to aesthetically appreciate such a model, we are
appreciating her not as what she actually is (in the category of human beings), but rather
as what she appears to be (in the category of sex objects).15 This aesthetic appreciation, if
positive, has ethical implications in that it supposedly engenders a sexist attitude towards
women. The point of this example is to show that the aesthetic experience goes beyond
the senses and is influenced greatly by our “emotional and psychological selves”.16 There
is a sense in which ethics and aesthetics are both shaped and reinforced by one another in
this example. We may already have sexist views before we start looking at the centerfold
and appreciating her in the wrong category, but there is a sense in which our ethical
views are reinforced by continuing to appreciate the model in the category of sex objects.
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What and how we appreciate significantly influences our ethical views. Yet, there is a
complex reciprocity in which our ethical views determine the content of our aesthetic
appreciation. Aesthetics and ethics seem to be, at least at times, intimately connected with
one another. Of course, one can deny that an aesthetic experience needs to be morally
engaged, and a certain kind of detachment may enable such an experience. Yet, the
overarching normative claim in this example is merely that we should appreciate the
woman as she actually is, and this is in the category of human beings.
Carlson extends this notion to the aesthetic appreciation of nature. The underlying
normative assumption the scientific cognitive model both addresses and achieves is that
we should appreciate nature as it in fact is rather than as what it may appear to be.
Carlson believes this type of aesthetic appreciation will affect our ethical views. “By
aesthetically appreciating nature for what it is, we will shape our ethical views such that
there is the best opportunity for making sound ecological judgments about matters of
environmental and ecological concern.”17 He gives the example of the human-made
coastline, and how perceiving it in its correct category (a human-made rather than natural
coastline), may influence the land management surrounding it. In this example, our
environmental and ethical responsibilities change depending on how we perceive the
coastline. If the rate at which salmon spawn along the coastline is decreasing, viewing the
coast as artificial may be conducive to promoting the construction of fish ladders to aid
with spawning. If the coastline is considered natural, such infrastructure may be seen as
out of place, and therefore as ugly. In this case, the particular action undertaken depends
upon category identification. The judgment of the coastline as natural or unnatural is not
an aesthetic judgment, but rather a nonaesthetic judgment which affects the aesthetic.
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Carlson sees an ethical merit in the correct identification of the categories
themselves, as well as in describing things as they in fact are. He believes that correct
identification provides the foundation for aesthetics, ethics, and the natural sciences to
come together in a way where they can reinforce one another.18 For Carlson, objectivity
has ethical implications and this is why the scientific cognitive model appears to contain
the necessary requirements of an aesthetic that can do work for environmental and
ecological concerns. In addition to the objectivity gained in correctly appreciating nature
in particular categories, scientific knowledge leads to aesthetic value in the natural world
in ways that we might otherwise miss, which itself can aid preservation efforts. The
deeper type of aesthetic appreciation science enables may allow one to recognize the
beauty in the swamp through an understanding of the ecological role it provides.
Similarly, as Sheila Lintott points out in her Austin bat example, a scientific
understanding of the ecological role and biological attributes of bats may enable an
aesthetic revolution. People who once found the creatures repulsive and ugly come to
aesthetically value them by gaining ecological knowledge. In these cases, scientific
understanding both promotes and supports an aesthetic interest.
Lintott supports what she terms an “eco-friendly aesthetic,” which gains its
backing from scientific education. For her, it is important for us to learn how to generate
aesthetic responses that lead to sustainable care. She too believes a large part of this
depends on placing objects in nature within their correct categories. Lintott provides the
example of the Venus flytrap, which may be considered ugly by a person who is not
scientifically informed since jaws are thought to be a contrastandard feature of plants.
With scientific understanding we can come to recognize the jaw-like apparatus as a
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variable feature, irrelevant to the object’s membership in a particular category.19
Scientific understanding will also show that carnivorous plants like the Venus flytrap
combine features common to other plants in interesting ways. These realizations grounded in scientific understanding - have the potential to promote aesthetic
appreciation of a plant that might otherwise be ignored.
In her essay “The Beauty that Requires Health,” Marcia Eaton looks at how
Carlson’s scientific cognitive model contributes to designing sustainable landscapes. She
examines how knowledge influences our aesthetic experiences as well as informs the
relationship between aesthetics and ecological health. Eaton believes knowledge
contributes to sustainability and that what is seen as ecologically unhealthy can thereby
be seen as aesthetically deficient. Eaton supports the anti-formalist notion that knowledge
of non-perceptible qualities which cannot be immediately seen are a necessary part of the
aesthetic experience. These extrinsic qualities gained from scientific knowledge can have
an effect on the viewer’s perception of intrinsic qualities. In many cases, as Lintott also
pointed out, this can cause the viewer to notice things that may have otherwise been
overlooked. She lists several examples, such as the aesthetic response to landscapes
disturbed by fire as well as non-native species.
Burned landscapes can often appear devastated, and to the untrained eye, may
appear ugly in their ruin. Yet, someone with knowledge of fire ecology will be aware of
the succession of vegetation and the differences in undergrowth in the future. Regarding
non-native species, Eaton asks if one should feel aesthetic repulsion at the sight of a one,
since they can have devastating results for ecosystems.20 In both cases Eaton wants to
point out that our aesthetic experience is influenced by our cognition, leading to
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experiences that are either better or worse based on the type of extrinsic qualities. In the
case of fire, it is suggested that outside knowledge creates a better aesthetic experience.
In the case of invasive species, it creates a worse experience. While she acknowledges the
difficulty in determining what ecological health looks like, she wants to maintain that
aesthetic and ecological well-being can and should be perceived simultaneously. In other
words, she wants health and beauty to begin to come together in a way where they both
inform and reinforce one another.
In considering the extent to which they do come together, Eaton suggests
ecologists and aestheticians must consider the role categories of scale and landscape play
in our experience. The context in which one has an aesthetic experience determines
which values become relevant. In both ecology and aesthetics the positive and negative
features of a particular locale need to be clarified for an appropriate assessment.21 For
instance, we cannot expect to find certain ecological features in every location.
Prototypes for what counts as healthy must be based on the socio-geographical locale
being considered, for what counts as healthy and beautiful in one may not apply to others.
Biology and scientific understanding, of course, play an important role in this
determination, telling us how certain environments should look and what features they
should possess. Eaton uses the scientific cognitive model in this sense to allow for a
correct recognition of particular landscapes and their relevant features.
For each environment or locale, Eaton believes aesthetic and ecological
inventories should be made. Certain properties need to be determined so that category
mistakes don’t take place. The roots of this notion seem to be best supported with
Carlson’s cognitive model, where scientific knowledge provides the foundation for

27

determining what constitutes a healthy - and therefore more beautiful - landscape or
ecosystem. Eaton’s discussion of the role categories play in determining health and
beauty should provide further insight into Carlson’s example of the human-made
coastline. Category attribution is central to our experience of a given locale, and our
environmental and ethical responsibilities depend on our categorically informed
experience. Perceiving the coastline in its correct category, as a product of human
intervention, has clear implications for the management decisions surrounding it.
For both Carlson and Eaton, knowledge works not only to help us perceive
qualities that may have otherwise gone unnoticed, but to perceive these qualities in the
appropriate category. Eaton and others believe someone whose aesthetic response is
based on scientific knowledge will be more likely to act in ecologically sustainable
ways.22 There is a certain reciprocity in her view, as landscapes that are ecologically
sustainable are ultimately aesthetic as well. “Aesthetic and ecological soundness will be
perceived simultaneously. The upshot will be, I hope, that health and beauty begin to
come together. If this happens, then both aesthetic and ecological sustainability may
result.”23 Eaton suggests that if we are going to develop a basis for rational evaluation of
a landscape’s ecological sustainability, we must stress the cognitive.24 Eaton and Lintott
both demonstrate how an ecological ethic can be rooted in a scientific cognitive model of
aesthetic appreciation. As Ned Hettinger points out, Eaton maintains an instrumental
view of environmental aesthetics, where the aesthetic response is justified to the extent
that it has positive implications for environmental protectionism.25 There is a particular
consensus among aestheticians that for an aesthetic model to have these positive
implications, and thus do work for ethics, it must be deep and objective.
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III. Re-examining the Scientific Cognitive Model

The main strengths of the scientific cognitive model seem to lie in the objectivity
and depth it grants to the aesthetic experience. It allows us to find beauty where we may
otherwise have not in addition to deepening beauty that is already present. We may find a
particular tree beautiful, but how much deeper and more meaningful would our
appreciation of its beauty be if we considered it in a larger ecological context? When we
become aware of the tree as a manifestation of evolutionary forces, taking note of things
like its age and functions, we become capable of a richer appreciation. Relatedly, the
scientific cognitive model also enables an objectivity that comes from correct category
identification, allowing us to view an object as it actually is. This enables us to avoid
aesthetic omissions and deceptions, giving us a way out of worrisome tendencies in
aesthetics that may have us favor scenic landscapes over ones that are more ecologically
beneficial. This kind of preference results from omissions in the aesthetic experience
itself.
When we are confined to superficial assessments of beauty, absent of scientific
knowledge regarding the ecological features, role and interest of a given environment, we
typically overlay the aesthetic experience with the type of trivial aesthetic notions
inherent in the object and landscape models. When we take the extension to ethics into
account, this is clearly problematic. Carlson believes that by appreciating nature as it in
fact is creates better opportunity for making sound ecological decisions. In this section, I
will examine some of the scientific cognitive model’s strengths, showing other ways we
can be afforded a richer aesthetic experience as well as locating the problem with
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categories. In doing so, I will call into question the idea of appreciating nature as nature
as well as the scientific cognitive model’s strong claim to objectivity. Ultimately, I will
argue that the judgment of beauty should be in part something that resides outside of
category attributions.
The scientific cognitive model is indeed capable of allowing for a deeper aesthetic
experience. It accomplishes this by directing our attention to certain qualities in nature
that we can begin to recognize as aesthetic. Scientific knowledge adds another layer to
our aesthetic experience, enhancing our appreciation of nature. In her essay “Scientific
Knowledge and the Aesthetic Appreciation of Nature” Patricia Matthews points to the
distinction between thick and thin conceptions of nature, where the latter focuses on
surface qualities and the former on the deeper and additional properties afforded by
relevant knowledge. Matthews refers to Robert Stecker’s notion that scientific knowledge
can enhance our appreciation of nature by allowing us to perceive it in more complex
ways.26 Matthews’ notion of thickness can be thought of as synonymous with Carlson’s
idea of depth in the aesthetic experience.
In this way, knowledge works to fill in gaps, thickening our conception of the
natural world. These gaps are filled in by the discovery of certain properties in nature we
can find beautiful. Rolston alludes to these in the aforementioned quote from the first
section about unity, harmony, and stability, suggesting that science uncovers these
aesthetic qualities in nature. Yet, this idea seems to be problematic. Even if we granted
that these properties were always found in nature and that they served to enhance our
aesthetic experience, this doesn’t preclude many other kinds of knowledge from
significantly enhancing the aesthetic experience in various ways. The scientific cognitive
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model can certainly deepen our appreciation in certain respects, but it is not the only
model that bears this distinction.
Other cognitive approaches to the aesthetic experience can thicken our conception
of nature by uncovering additional properties through certain types of knowledge that can
add depth to the experience. In her essay “Appreciating Nature on Its Own Terms,”
Yukio Saito discusses an “associationist”27 appreciation of nature, where historical and
cultural knowledge play an important role in the aesthetic experience. While this model is
not without its own set of problems, it does show how local traditions, literature, and
history can enhance the aesthetic experience, serving as a compliment or alternative to
scientific knowledge. She believes certain indigenous traditions can help us understand
phenomena and objects in nature, influencing the aesthetic experience. It would seem that
other types of knowledge can inform and deepen our appreciation of nature in much the
same way that scientific knowledge can.
Certain objects in nature have historical and cultural significance, and our
knowledge of this significance is certainly going to affect our aesthetic experience. The
experience an American has when viewing a bald eagle is influenced by the fact that this
eagle is representative of our country. The fact that the bald eagle appears on most
official seals and on the back of several coins is very likely to affect an American’s
experience in seeing one. Its particular reverence in our culture is going to shape our
perception differently than if it were just another bird of prey. This cultural knowledge
can direct our attention to certain qualities of the eagle, serving to thicken of conception
of the bird by adding another layer onto the experience. This notion becomes even more
relevant when narratives relate directly to perceivable qualities of an object in nature.
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In the White Mountains of New Hampshire there used to exist a jagged
resemblance of a face in a series of five granite cliff ledges of Cannon Mountain. This
rock image was referred to as the Old Man of the Mountain, and has provided much
cultural significance to the area. Scientific knowledge certainly contributes to one’s
appreciation of the formation, such as the recognition that it was carved by glaciers. Yet,
this seems to be overshadowed by the historical knowledge and cultural significance
given to the rock. This knowledge affords an aesthetic depth of experience, and like the
scientific cognitive model, is able to go beyond the surface. In this case the aesthetic
value relies on correct, informed, and relevant knowledge, the difference being this
knowledge is cultural rather than ecological. This knowledge provides foci of
appreciation that uncover aspects of the natural world that may be considered aesthetic
when viewed appropriately.
There are many examples where an associationist appreciation of nature can
deepen the aesthetic experience, adding layers to initially perceived surface qualities.
This knowledge allows for a deeper appreciation, although in a different way than the
depth arrived at with scientific knowledge. Relatedly, cultural knowledge can also help us
to uncover a certain beauty where we might otherwise have not. Just like scientific
knowledge, it can help us discover what is aesthetically relevant about nature by focusing
our attention on certain aspects of an object. Where the two types of knowledge differ, as
Saito rightly points out, is that scientific knowledge pertains to what the object is in its
own right, without any kind of human intervention or deliberate cultivation. Carlson
himself seems to admit that in some cases cultural associations can enhance one’s
appreciation. However, he also maintains that if aesthetic appreciation is to be serious, it
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must appreciate nature as it in fact is. Cultural and historical knowledge found in an
associationist appreciation of nature fails to appreciate nature for what it actually is.
Clearly, there are other models besides the scientific cognitive that are able to provide a
richer aesthetic experience that goes beyond mere surface qualities. Its unique strength,
therefore, seems to lie in its objectivity and ability to appreciate nature as nature. Again,
one of the underlying normative assumptions of the model is that the seriousness and
appropriateness of the aesthetic experience depends on whether it captures objects “as
they in fact are and in light of knowledge of their real natures”.28 Thus, because the
associationist model doesn’t capture nature as nature it may be considered less serious
and less appropriate as a model for environmental aesthetics.
Yet, what does it mean to appreciate nature as nature? Clearly, when nature is
humanized and cultivated through certain kinds of knowledge, it is not being appreciated
for what it actually is. But this is not to say that scientific knowledge is the only way of
responding to nature as nature. Noel Carroll makes this point in his essay “On Being
Moved By Nature,” in his discussion of responding to nature emotionally. “If I am taken
with the grace of a group of deer vaulting a stream, I see no reason to suppose that I am
not responding to nature as nature.”29 Carroll seems to suggest that a scientific
understanding of the deer does not aid in his ability to appreciate them for what they are.
For Carlson, placing the deer in its correct category via scientific knowledge is what
enables us to appreciate the deer as it actually is. Carroll, on the other hand, sees the
grace of the deer as a quality that actually exists in nature, a quality we can appreciate
without having to place the deer in its respective category. He would argue that in doing
so, we are still appreciating the deer as it actually is. Carlson may question this notion
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based on the normative claim that we should appreciate nature as it is, rather than as what
it may appear to be. Yet, it is questionable as to whether the scientific cognitive model is
the only means of accomplishing this. Perhaps more importantly, it is questionable as to
whether or not it even accomplishes this itself.
In his essay “Icebreakers” Stanley Godlovitch discusses the humanization that
lurks in science, questioning its strict dominance in objectivity and ability to provide a
nonanthropocentric framework. Godlovitch first mentions the challenges (albeit
controversial) presented by Antirealists, Internal Realists, and Relativists. Despite their
controversy, he believes they do awaken enough doubt to motivate the resistance of
excessive reliance on science in the realm of aesthetic appreciation. In other words, strict
scientific realism which posits objective truths across time has been called into question.
This should at least awaken some doubts for basing all of our aesthetic notions on
scientific categories and interpretations, which, for instance, may be relative to their time.
He then refers to the history of science, suggesting that if one theory turns out to be false,
this shouldn’t ruin one’s aesthetic appreciation.
The history of science is partially one of rejection, false hopes, vainglorious
fantasies. Firm scientific categories have been mistaken; presumed natural kinds
never have existed; stock theoretical terms failed to refer; grand theories have
withered. Suppose your appreciation of some natural phenomenon rested upon
what turned out to be a false scientific theory. What do you suppose would
happen? Would your appreciation be dimmed? Would you marvel the less? I
certainly hope not.30
Perhaps most significantly he reveals the operative constraints of the scientific
enterprise, the categories of which arise on our own terms through theorizing,
measurement, and experimentation.31 The functional limits of science categorize and
compose nature in a way that has us question whether it is appreciating nature on its own

34

terms. “If we look to science to give us those needed categories on which to hang our
appreciation, we exchange but one form of human-centered cognition for another.”32
Relatedly, social constructivism shows us how the concept of experiencing nature
as nature can be problematic. It seems to be epistemically impossible to ever purely
experience nature because we can only encounter it within a human framework or
through a human lens. In experiencing nature from a human perspective it can be
maintained that we are not really experiencing nature as itself, since we necessarily
experience it through the transformative lens of our perceptual and cognitive apparatus.
In Kantian terms, we are denied access to the “thing in itself”. Nature will never be
unmediated by categories, and so at the level of knowledge and experience, nature will
always remain at arm’s length. By interpreting reality through the very categories Carlson
suggests we should use to influence our aesthetic appreciation, we are unable to get to
nature itself. Scientific categories do not get us out of this predicament of being unable to
treat nature as nature, but rather make it more explicit. Thus, it would seem that the fact
that we are human could preclude us from experiencing nature as nature. Scientific
understanding doesn’t seem to get us out of this predicament and, as Godlovitch points
out, there is a very real sense in which science itself humanizes.
While the idea that science can tell us what nature “actually is” should be
questioned, it should not be abandoned. Science may be limited in its ability to enable
such appreciation, and so could potentially be supplemented with other methods. The
main point of this discussion was to merely show the ambiguity of the concept of
appreciating nature as nature. Given that science itself may fail to enable an aesthetic
appreciation of nature as nature, we should ask why this is something we should strive for
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in aesthetics. In other words, why is objectivity in the aesthetics of nature so important
and why do ethical decisions rely on it so heavily? Carlson argues that correct category
interpretations are an essential part of the aesthetic experience, ones that ensure a lack of
aesthetic omissions and deceptions. These deceptions are supposedly problematic not
only from an aesthetic standpoint, but from an ethical standpoint as well, since they can
go on to shape environmental decisions. Thus, Carlson and many others believe that if
aesthetics is going to do work for ethics, it must be limited and relegated to categories. I
will revisit this notion later on, but first let us look at the aesthetic experience as it is
confined to category interpretation.
It seems that aesthetic judgments can be made that do not rely on knowing an
object’s relational properties to others in its category. While knowledge can certainly
affect our aesthetic experience, it needn’t inform it entirely. To relegate aesthetic
judgments to category interpretation seems to omit a large portion of the aesthetic
experience. Aesthetic responses are complex and there are many other elements besides
scientific understanding that factor into these experiences. We should have no reason for
thinking that these other elements, both cognitive and non-cognitive, are less meaningful
in our response, and certainly not that they are less useful for the extension from
aesthetics to ethics. To show why the aesthetic response can and should extend beyond
mere category interpretation I will return to the discussion of art and introduce Nick
Zangwill’s example of cross category judgments.
In Categories of Art Kendall Walton wants to suggest that all aesthetic properties
we judge are dependent on the category in which they are identified. Zangwill provides a
response which lies in the psychological process that occurs when we make cross-
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category judgments. For Zangwill, categories can qualify our judgments, but do not
completely underline them. While we may say that something is elegant for its category,
this doesn’t necessarily mean that our judgments are category dependent. This is
sometimes just a way of making quicker and easier ascriptions regarding our appreciation
as a matter of degree.33 Zangwill wants to make the distinction between matters of degree
and category-dependence. He uses the example of Minoan and Mycenean seals and how
we may judge that the former are more dynamic as a class than the latter. If there is a
Mycenean seal we judge to be dynamic for its class, and a Minoan seal that is not
dynamic for its class, we may still judge the latter to be the more dynamic of the two.34
While we here appreciate the Mycenean seal compared to most others of its class, we
may still judge it not to be very dynamic all by itself. Thus, while our judgments and
ascriptions are often qualified by a category, it is because we are speaking in terms of
relativity and matters of degree. Zangwill points out that this is not the same as judging it
merely from the art-historical category. And so, “category-dependent judgments are only
possible because of category-neutral ones.”35
In order to make comparisons, we must be able to judge the intrinsic aesthetic
qualities of a work and this often does not depend on knowing its relational properties to
other works. This allows us to maintain the notion that certain works are more or less
dynamic than others, irrespective of its context and category. It is conceivable that
Walton could make the rejoinder that if we consider something to be dynamic for a
painting, but not overall, we are somehow invoking a broader category that includes
painting and more dynamic art forms. Yet, Walton’s categories do not seem to deal with
attributes or judgments such as dynamism, but rather with the categories/mediums
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themselves. In other words, the judgment of beauty or dynamism is one that must remain
outside our notions of categories in art, as categories do not always affect such
judgments.
Zangwill’s main emphasis seems to be that we should not always assume
aesthetic properties relevant to a work of art are dependent on their art-historical
category. As Carlson extended Walton’s categorical interpretation from art to nature, I
would like to extend Zangwill’s point in the same way. The category method of finding
beauty doesn’t appear to exhaust the aesthetic experience, nor does it necessarily
trivialize the beauty which may or may not be present. Without categories or in moving
beyond categories, Carlson sees a certain kind of trivialization taking place. Yet, is the
beauty of a landscape necessarily trivialized when we compare it to another? What is
important to grasp here is that the means for comparison often come to us in other ways
besides categories. While knowledge of categories, both in art and nature, can influence
an aesthetic experience, it does not provide its entire foundation.
In this section I have shown the limits of the scientific cognitive model and how
many of its supposed strengths can be achieved through other modes of aesthetic
appreciation. I have called into question the concept of appreciating nature as nature (or
an object on its own terms), as well as the model’s claim to a strict objectivity.
Godlovitch’s point about humanization at least shows that the objectivity found in the
scientific cognitive model is of a certain, restricted type. This type, I will later suggest, is
not superior to the type of objectivity at work in the models of both Carroll and Brady. In
this section I have also shown how, in relying on a rigid set of categories, the scientific
cognitive model limits the aesthetic experience, missing out on a fundamental element of
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beauty and a means of its attainment. These limitations will be important to keep in mind
when considering alternative modes of appreciating nature, both from an aesthetic
standpoint and from the support this value lends to ethical decision making. I have set the
foundation for showing how the scientific cognitive model narrows the aesthetic
experience by limiting it to categories and if relied on exclusively, limits the work
aesthetic considerations might do for preservation efforts.
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IV: Further Problems for the Scientific Cognitive Model

We can find beauty in the natural world in a multitude of ways. The aesthetic
response to nature is complex and to limit it to correct category interpretation based on
scientific knowledge and common sense seems to rob it of something essential. There
seems to be a certain level where appreciation of beauty goes beyond categories, a level
that I would maintain is both serious and appropriate. I would also argue it is one that can
still be useful for the extension to ethics. The scientific cognitive model leaves out a
significant portion of the aesthetic experience and what it omits other responses can help
illuminate. The aesthetic imperative which has us protect something because it is
beautiful can be arrived at in various ways, and there is no reason for thinking other
responses to the natural world may work to undermine this imperative. In this section I
will provide the foundation for positing that other aesthetic responses to nature can still
do work for ethics without compromising environmental decision making. I will show
how scientific knowledge in the aesthetic experience doesn’t always provide for clear cut
decision making. This knowledge can be viewed in many instances as irrelevant to both
aesthetic and ethical responses. Relatedly, we will investigate the type of value that takes
precedence when beauty and ecological health fail to line up.
Carlson argues that correct category interpretations are an essential part of the
aesthetic experience and ensure a lack of aesthetic omissions and deceptions. These
deceptions are supposedly problematic not only from an aesthetic standpoint, but from an
ethical standpoint as well, since they can go on to shape ethical obligations and
environmental decisions. Recall Marcia Eaton’s idea that the extrinsic qualities provided
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by cognition can affect the viewer’s perception of intrinsic qualities. This can lead to
either a more positive or negative aesthetic experience as she shows with the examples of
the burnt forest and invasive species. Eaton’s goal, of course, is to bring health and
beauty together, and she believes that only in relying on scientific knowledge and correct
category perception can we begin to do so. Yet, in so doing I would argue that one is
forced to rely on a value besides beauty. Eaton wants to equate beauty with health, but
beauty is much more than merely health. Health is its own type of value, while beauty is
another. At the very most, health is just one component of beauty. It seems even with
scientific knowledge we may not find a swamp in New Jersey more beautiful than a
mountain vista in Glacier National Park, despite the fact that the former may serve a more
ecologically beneficial role or may, under certain circumstances, be a healthier ecosystem
than the latter. In other words, preservation efforts in this case aren’t dependent on
beauty, nor should they be. The beauty in this case lies elsewhere, and it should be clear
that scientific knowledge is informing environmental decision making without the use of
aesthetics. This should come as obvious, but requires further discussion in order to
provide a proper foundation for the incorporation of other of aesthetic models.
To further explicate this notion let us consider the example of an invasive species:
spotted knapweed. Knapweed can have a profound effect on an ecosystem, altering its
structure, organization, and function. Soil in areas that are dominated by this noxious
weed can have lower amounts of organic matter and available nitrogen than soil that
supports native plants. This weed alters the abundance of native plant species by
outcompeting them, producing a greater abundance of seeds, growing faster, and draining
the soil of water and nutrients. Knapweed has been shown to reduce biodiversity,
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increase soil erosion, and replace wildlife and livestock forage on rangeland and
pasture.36 As Eaton pointed out, scientific knowledge about spotted knapweed and its
ecological effects can have a negative influence on the aesthetic experience. This is, of
course, the familiar idea that relevant knowledge of non-aesthetic properties should affect
our aesthetic experience.
Yet, there is a very real sense in which despite this knowledge, one may still come
to see a field full of these purple flowers as possessing beauty. Scientific knowledge is
neutral and beauty is ultimately derived from the features of an object or landscape that
one chooses to emphasize. We will consider this point more fully later on, but first let us
examine the normative ecological ramifications of this particular aesthetic experience.
Should we work to protect the knapweed and preserve it on account of its beauty?
Certainly not. What this example illustrates is that a value other than beauty is being
imported into ethical, value-based decision making. Rather than reinterpreting the beauty
we see from an ethical standpoint based on scientific knowledge we should be able to
acknowledge the beauty in a field of knapweed and base our decisions on values other
than beauty, namely, the value of ecological health. To masquerade the latter as the
former entails implausibly denying an essential part of the aesthetic experience.
Scientific knowledge serves to destroy the aesthetic experience in the case of the
invasive species, but only in a limited sense. Correct category interpretation serves to
identify the plant as an invasive species and make one aware of its harmful effects on the
ecosystem in which it is contained. Yet, recall, as Zangwill showed in the last section,
that a significant part of the judgment of beauty lies outside the realm of category
identification. The aesthetic imperative that has us protect something because we derive
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value from its beauty clearly falls apart in this case, although I would argue not because
the knapweed is not beautiful. It falls apart because the value of whatever beauty the
plant may or may not possess is insignificant when compared to the harm it causes the
ecosystem. One shouldn’t align ecological health and beauty in this case, but rather
separate the two and acknowledge that the latter is more important to decision making.
The obvious reply from the scientific cognitivist in the case of knapweed is that
relevant knowledge will automatically have a negative influence on the aesthetic
experience, or at the very least, change the quality of the beauty. With this in mind,
Patricia Matthews in her essay “Scientific Knowledge and the Aesthetic Appreciation of
Nature” provides the example of a black eye on a child who was the victim of abuse. She
points out that the bruise, if taken out of context and without relevant knowledge
surrounding its color variation, might be found as beautiful.37 However, once the bruise is
determined to be a sign of abuse, and it is understood why a blow to the face might result
in this kind of color variation, the viewer no longer sees it as such. At the very least, the
quality of the beauty that it may still exhibit is utterly transformed into something of a
more sad nature. “It is not just that the bruise is viewed as both sad and beautiful, but the
sadness pervades the beauty and changes its aesthetic quality.”38
Matthews claims this same kind of change may happen with invasive species.
Yet, while the quality of the beauty may change when we recognize the invasive as being
harmful to the environment, there are no non-question begging justifications for
preferring one type of beauty over another. The notion that beauty based on scientific
knowledge is helpful in environmental decision making is problematic because science
itself isn’t as value-laden as Eaton and others might have us believe. Scientific
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knowledge does not inform us as to why we should prefer a non-harmful indigenous
species over one that is invasive and harmful. It merely gives us the means for
distinguishing the two, and if we are still inclined to find the knapweed beautiful, science
gives us no reason for thinking otherwise. The connection from beauty to ethics is not
fully made, as scientific knowledge on its own doesn’t provide us with clear-cut ethical
decisions. The study of ecology may guide us to undertake certain actions when coupled
with resource management and conservations goals, but this has nothing to do with
beauty. If beauty is our concern, biological knowledge and appreciation of knapweed
may interfere with the type of ecological knowledge that should supposedly engender a
negative aesthetic response.
Yet, if beauty is still a relevant concern, recognizing knapweed as knapweed and
being aware of its impact doesn’t automatically lead to sound judgments about matters of
environmental concern. In other words, it is not clear how scientific knowledge, in so far
as it helps us to recognize beauty, should inform our environmental decision making.
Scientific knowledge is neutral, and it doesn’t seem to always be that helpful for our
preservation efforts when beauty is the value driving these efforts. This is because
scientific knowledge can lead to conflicting aesthetic responses. With spotted knapweed,
scientific knowledge may inform the viewer of the plant’s detriment to local ecosystems,
but it may also uncover a wealth of aesthetic interest in the species itself. Knowledge of
the plant’s origin, reproductive efforts, and resiliency may just as easily provoke a
positive aesthetic appreciation. The fact that the plant is harmful to its local environment
is a fact science helps uncover, not a value that it helps support.
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How science is used in the case of the invasive species is ultimately up to the
subject assessing it beauty. One might recognize the plant as harmful, inducing a negative
aesthetic response, while another may recognize the plant as an interesting example of
how a species can thrive in the absence of native agents of control. Either way, scientific
knowledge is not going to offer clear cut normative insights while under the umbrella of
aesthetics. Even if science enables a positive aesthetic reaction, we are not going to
preserve the invasive species. It would seem an aesthetic model that is so intimately
connected to ethics would be able to rule this judgment out. Yet, with science’s
neutrality, no automatic response of this kind can come from this model. Another value
needs to be imported for our decision making and this value - that of ecological health ultimately resides outside of the aesthetic experience. Furthermore, it isn’t exactly clear at
what point ecological health and beauty line up, and each value seems to reside in a
spectrum that makes their alignment a bit unclear. For instance, it isn’t exactly clear as to
what constitutes ecological health.
Consider the aesthetic experience of a sunset. Colors in the sky are determined by
how sunlight interacts with nitrogen and oxygen molecules in the air, which deflect light
in all directions. This is known as Rayleigh scattering. Colors with shorter wavelengths
like violet and red are scattered most, indicating the existence of more particles in the
atmosphere. Red sunsets are caused by aerosols, which are solid or liquid particles
originated from both natural processes and human activity. Aerosols are produced when
gas molecules enter the atmosphere and react with other chemicals. One such case is the
burning of fossil fuels, which releases sulfur dioxide into the air which turns into sulfuric
acid aerosols. Natural aerosols can come from a number of things, including forest fires,
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sandstorms, and volcanic eruptions, the latter of which inject sulfuric acid droplets into
the stratosphere.39 Scientific knowledge, in the case of the sunset, reveals how the colors
in the sky are determined as well as what is causing the sulfuric acid droplets to be there
in the first place.
Knowledge of what makes a sunset red in both natural processes and human
activity is based on scientific understanding. According to the scientific cognitivist, this
understanding is meant to inform and ultimately shape the nature of the aesthetic
experience. In both the case of a red sunset induced by a volcano and one induced by
smog, one is confronted with sulfuric acid aerosols. In one case a proponent of the
scientific cognitive model would maintain that scientific knowledge has a positive effect
on the aesthetic experience, and in one case a negative effect, despite the fact the
experiences may be perceptibly indistinguishable and that they both involve sulfuric acid.
This is because knowledge of what produced the sulfuric acid is ultimately shaping both
aesthetic and ethical judgment of the phenomenon. It should be clear that if we import
scientific understanding, we are probably going to have a more negative reaction when
looking at a sunset over Los Angeles. Common sense tells us there is a high
concentration of pollution and man-made aerosols and scientific knowledge tells us how
these aerosols affect the sunset. Relatedly, our experience of a red sunset caused by a
volcano is bound to be of a more positive nature. Yet, it isn’t exactly clear why this
should be the case.
First, the existence of sulfuric acid in the atmosphere is no more detrimental in
one case than it is in the other. If we are to align beauty with ecological health these two
instances must remain virtually indistinguishable. Valuing one over the other merely
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because it is natural involves importing a whole other set of values having to do with the
natural and artificial distinction. The problems of this distinction are well known.40 It
isn’t problematic to value one sunset over another because it is natural, but this entails
importing another value besides beauty. Another, and perhaps more significant problem
lies in the line that has to be drawn to distinguish one experience from the other. The
example is clear cut in the case of an LA sunset, or perhaps even in the case of a remote
volcano, but what about when the example is less obvious? It seems there could be many
cases where the sulfuric acid that causes red sunsets could be a combination of man-made
and natural aerosols. At what point and with what concentration is the experience made
positive or negative? It would be an odd move to base an aesthetic experience off this
determination and one can imagine a team of scientists working diligently to pin down
the concentrations of natural and man-made aerosols before we can be in a position to
appropriately judge the beauty of the red sky. Is this what is needed for a deeper, more
serious aesthetic? I should hope not, and there is a sense in which science frustrates the
ability to direct our ethical and environmental decision making when it is wrapped up in
aesthetics.
In this section I have argued against the alignment of beauty and ecological health
and have shown that scientific knowledge isn’t always useful in locating a beauty that
will provide clear normative insights for environmental decision making. I have treated
beauty and ecological health as separate values, suggesting that if beauty conflicts with
ecological health, it should be pushed aside. This is hardly a controversial claim. More
significantly, I have shown that even when arrived at with scientific knowledge (via the
scientific cognitive model), beauty can still conflict with ecological health. When this
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happens our environmental decisions are informed by scientific knowledge, but
knowledge that is clearly departed from the realm of aesthetics. Given that beauty is not
the deciding factor we should be willing to consider other models of aesthetic
appreciation. This is not to say that any model will do, as I still want to maintain that
some aesthetic responses are better than others. The quality of the aesthetic response has
nothing to do with the work it does for ethics, but should be deemed appropriate or
inappropriate on its own right. This is important because beauty can be achieved in a
multitude of ways and just because this value can be conferred doesn’t mean it should be.
Whether or not it should be has less to do with the ethical implications and more to do
with the plausibility of the aesthetic model itself. This is, of course, a matter of the
model’s depth, seriousness, appropriateness, and objectivity.
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V: The Move to Constrained Pluralism

It goes without saying that ecological decisions needn’t rely on aesthetics.
Relatedly, ecological health and beauty aren’t always going to line up. The point of this
discussion is not to suggest either of these notions, but merely to point out the move that
takes place when they don’t line up. This move, which pushes aesthetic considerations in
the background, happens whenever ecological health outweighs aesthetic concerns. What
this move suggests isn’t that aesthetics should be completely ignored, but rather that there
is always a certain kind of safety net ready to steer environmental decision making, no
matter what the aesthetic value given to a segment of nature. Scientific knowledge may
help to uncover an aesthetic beauty or interest in a forest decimated by a beetle
population due to fascination with the beetle’s ability to thrive, but this will hardly
provide the impetus for preservation. Scientific knowledge doesn’t provide any more
grounds than any other model for thinking that aesthetics and ecological health need to
line up.
The normative claim that comes from this is ultimately secondary and separate,
and scientific knowledge is no more than a neutral bystander in this regard. There are
some cases where beauty and ecological health come together, but there are also many
cases where they do not. The worry for those like Eaton is that without science to guide
aesthetics, we may end up with arbitrary judgments and therefore ecologically harmful
decision making. The fact that a value lies outside of the aesthetic experience should
guard against the worry that more subjective aesthetic experiences may be harmful.
Relatedly, it isn’t exactly clear why aesthetic judgments that aren’t based on science are
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necessarily arbitrary. In this section I will examine two other models of aesthetic
appreciation and show why they may serve as compliments to the scientific cognitive
model in order to provide further support for preservation efforts. To do this I will show
how objectivity is still maintained in these models, which provides the means for better
and worse aesthetic responses while guiding our experience in an appropriate manner.
Scientific knowledge provides one kind of aesthetic interest or value that is
grounded in a certain kind of cognition. There is no reason to suspect that other kinds of
interest cannot aid in preservation efforts as well, and do so in an appropriate manner.
Just as focusing on the picturesque may have us neglect a great deal of experiences of the
natural world that might otherwise be considered aesthetic, so too does relying solely on
science. Furthermore, relying on science may cause us to miss other appropriate aesthetic
responses. Some are concerned that without an aesthetic based on scientific knowledge
and categories, aesthetics lacks a certain importance in environmental assessment, basing
beauty’s value on the whims of the viewer. Without this objective ground for aesthetics,
some believe we are more subject to aesthetic omissions and deceptions that come from
incorrect category interpretation.
In the previous section I explored how science itself may be limited in its
objectivity. Relatedly, I have just discussed how when it comes to environmental
assessment, other values besides beauty ultimately shape our decision making.
Furthermore, the worry that these other models fail to appreciate nature as nature is
problematic when it is questionable as to whether or not this is even possible with
science. Thus, we may start to wonder why we need to worry about these other models if
they are still ultimately producing value in certain environments. Is there a problem with
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establishing ethical obligations to the environment based on a value that was achieved by
more subjective means? We may wonder what this problem is if beauty is not the
ultimate deciding factor for our environmental decisions. If objectivity is the main goal, it
isn’t clear that scientific knowledge needs to serve as the foundation of the aesthetic
response. So what do these other responses to the natural world look like, and where
might we locate their justification?
While maintaining that some aesthetic responses to nature are better than others,
some have proposed to handle the issue of objectivity differently. Noel Carroll’s
emotional response model and Emily Brady’s imagination based model attempt to keep
objectivity in the aesthetic response, but through a means other than scientific knowledge.
In his essay “On Being Moved by Nature,” Carroll writes “any competing picture of
nature appreciation, if it is to be taken seriously, must have a comparable means to those
of the natural environmental model (scientific cognitive) for solving the problem of
objectivity of nature appreciation”.41 Rather than scientific knowledge, Carroll bases his
objectivity on emotional arousal, suggesting that certain emotional states may or may not
be appropriate. According to Carroll, we can be moved by certain encounters with nature
without any knowledge of natural history. Furthermore, these types of aesthetic responses
are no less appropriate than those based on scientific knowledge. In Carroll’s mode of
appreciation, less emphasis is placed on the intellectual elements, and more on the
visceral and emotional elements that constitute the aesthetic response to nature.
Objectivity in Carroll’s model depends on whether or not emotions can be
determined to be appropriate or inappropriate. If they can be assessed on this ground,
they are open to cognitive appraisal. Carroll uses the example of fear, suggesting that
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such an emotion is appropriate for an emoter if the object of the emotion is considered
dangerous. What determines the danger in this case is whether such a belief is reasonable
for others to share. There must be some criterion to satisfy the appropriateness of a
particular emotion and for Carroll this is generally thought to be determined by reason,
consensus, and common sense. In this way he would argue there is a cognitive
component to an emotion, albeit of a different sort. In another example, Carroll suggests
it is appropriate to be moved and excited by the grandeur of a towering waterfall. If the
belief of the cascade being large scale is one that can be reasonably shared by others, then
the emotional response can be considered objective.42 But what if one agrees that the
cascade is of a large scale, but is not moved by the waterfall? In this case, Carroll
suggests we are simply going to find this response inappropriate. If the judgment is that
the towering waterfall is not of a large scale, we are apt to conclude that the subject either
does not understand the notion of large scale or is irrational to some degree.43 This also
may be due to the subject using the wrong comparison class, comparing the towering
waterfall to something far larger, such as the universe rather than judging it in relation to
the human scale.
It may at first seem that when Carroll invokes the notion of correct and incorrect
comparison classes he is supporting Carlson’s categorical interpretation. Yet, Carroll
maintains that establishing the relevant comparison class does not depend on scientific
categories. He provides the example of the blue whale, suggesting that one may still be
moved by its grandeur while thinking of it as a fish. The same could be said of having an
emotional response to mountains without an exact geological knowledge of their
formation. There is a strong visceral and emotional component when we stare at the
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Missions, regardless of our geological knowledge. The scientific cognitivist’s response in
this case should come as obvious, which will be to merely suggest that such aesthetic
appreciation is of a more shallow and less serious nature. Carlson admits that we can
simply enjoy nature, but that a serious aesthetic appreciation requires some level of
objectivity. Carroll responds to this worry by pointing out that “if the test of whether our
appreciation of nature is deep is whether the corresponding judgments are susceptible to
objective, cognitive appraisal,” there are some cases where an emotional response can
pass the test.44 Granted, the objectivity in Carroll’s model is of a different variety than
Carlson’s, but he denies that this leads to a more superficial aesthetic. How depth in the
response is measured isn’t exactly clear. Carroll admits the depth gained in a scientific
cognitive response may be different than that of emotional arousal, but this doesn’t mean
it is more important.
Emily Brady’s imagination-based environmental aesthetic focuses on the
significance of imagination in our aesthetic response. For instance, the awe we
experience when looking at a very steep cliff is intensified when we imagine ourselves
jumping off it. Brady emphasizes the importance of description in her aesthetic model.
She believes that imagination plays an essential role in uncovering the aesthetic character
of a place, and that once this character is realized and valued, we have further means for
conservation. Imagination allows us to make links and associations to other things so we
can get a better grasp of what we are experiencing. She provides the example of
imagining a forest before and after it has been cleared which enables the viewer to
“emphasize the empty, stark aesthetic character of the place”.45 This allows the viewer to
incorporate some subjectivity into the aesthetic response while relying on a type of
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cognition that isn’t based entirely on scientific knowledge. There is a descriptive sense in
which the aesthetic experience automatically draws upon memory and imagination as it
makes associations with given phenomena. Yet, there also appears to be a normative
sense in which such associations are useful for deepening the aesthetic experience and
providing further means for valuing a particular landscape.
The imagination model initially seems to lead to a merely subjective, arbitrary
aesthetic, but for Brady, not every imaginative response to nature is appropriate or
relevant to the aesthetic appreciation at hand. She achieves a distinct kind of objectivity
not all that different than Carroll’s. Shallow and naive responses are to be avoided, and
objectivity centers on judgments that are reasonable and justifiable.46 The type of
imagination involved in the aesthetic response must be of a very specific type. Brady
suggests that we must “imagine well,” which can be thought of conceiving of imagination
as one would a virtue, where skill and appropriateness depend upon the context. In this
way, Brady is able to refute the claim that her imagination-based model leads to an
aesthetic that is entirely subjective and arbitrary. Imagination in this sense also requires
the aesthetic notion of disinterestedness, which frees the mind from any self-interest or
instrumental concerns that may incorporate themselves into the aesthetic experience.
Aesthetic responses in which our imagination instrumentalizes nature are inappropriate.
In addition to providing an objective ground for valuing aesthetic judgment, Brady’s
notion of disinterestedness can be useful for the extension to ethics. This alleviates
worries which are tied to more subjective responses, for example, the attractiveness of a
clear-cut forest in the eyes of a logging executive.
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Aesthetic judgments for Brady must be reasonable, justifiable and disinterested,
and because of this she is able to maintain objectivity in the aesthetic response while
going beyond the scientific cognitive model. One can imagine Carlson responding to
Brady in a similar fashion as he might have to Carroll, suggesting that such an aesthetic is
superficial and more tied to the subjective whims of the viewer. However, while the
objectivity of Brady’s model is again of a different type than Carlson’s, this should not
lead us to deem it any less serious or appropriate to the aesthetic response. For one, the
judgments of Brady’s imagination model are also susceptible to cognitive appraisal.
There remains a cognitive element in the aesthetic response of both Carroll and Brady
given that emotions and imaginations are ultimately founded on thoughts and beliefs.
Ultimately, it is reliance on this element of cognition that enables a certain kind of
objectivity in the aesthetic response. Like Carlson, Carroll and Brady suggest that some
aesthetic responses are better or worse than others, but want to point out that this can be
determined on grounds other than science. These models show that at least a portion of
the aesthetic experience resides outside of correct category identification, doing so in an
appropriate manner. Because emotions and imagination can both be assessed by whether
or not they are appropriate, they are open to cognitive appraisal and therefore retain a
degree of objectivity.
In his essay “Objectivity In Environmental Aesthetics,” Ned Hettinger proposes a
“constrained pluralism” in environmental aesthetics, suggesting that various types of
responses to the natural world can be useful for environmentalism. This pluralism is
“constrained” in that it allows for more subjective responses, but still maintains some
limitations in these responses. For one, they must maintain some degree of objectivity.
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Hettinger suggests that some environmental responses are more appropriate than others
and that a rejection of scientific cognitivism as the only appropriate model doesn’t imply
an arbitrariness of appreciation. Hettinger thinks we should find criteria for evaluating
better and worse aesthetic responses, but that these criteria can come from a variety of
sources.
Legitimate pluralism regarding environmental beauty does not prevent
distinguishing between better and worse aesthetic responses. Environmental
aesthetics contains numerous resources for objectivity that hold promise for
justifying a significant role for judgments of natural beauty in environmental
protection. A knowledge-based environmental aesthetic can be useful to aesthetic
protectionism, but it is not the only useful environmental aesthetic, and it does not
guarantee beneficial environmental results.47
His position is one that falls between subjective and objective extremes, although he
believes aesthetics needs some type of objectivity to be useful for environmental
protection. Hettinger is inclined to regard Carlson, Carroll, and Brady’s models as useful
in this regard, acknowledging a certain subjectivity in a response since there is not only
one correct way to appreciate nature (scientific or otherwise).
Regarding the extension to ethics, Hettinger does believe relevant knowledge, say
of environmental degradation, should inform our aesthetic response. If we recall the
example of Berkeley Pit, it is scientific knowledge and common sense that informs us of
the pollution. However, this aesthetic response can be taken much further with both an
emotional and imaginative component. For instance, if we imagine the 342 carcasses
from the flock of snow geese that landed in the Pit while migrating in 1995, we are likely
to have an aesthetic experience that is both relevant and appropriate in the face of such
degradation. There is an emotional component to this particular imaginative process as
well, which works to enhance our aesthetic experience of the Pit. It is important to note,
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however, that the imaginative and emotional component of the aesthetic response doesn’t
necessarily guide us in our environmental decision making. Sometimes our aesthetic
response will line up with the correct ethical or environmental decision, and sometimes it
won’t. Neither science, emotion, or imagination can guarantee that it will, and there are
many cases where ecological health and beauty aren’t going to line up. Nonetheless,
scientific knowledge, emotion, and imagination can all function in a way that creates a
more complete aesthetic response. This aesthetic response can be useful in the extension
to ethics not in the direct guidance it offers to environmental decision making, but in the
value it bestows upon a given landscape or environment. Hettinger’s pluralism appears to
be the surest way of providing a more comprehensive aesthetic response while remaining
within the bounds of seriousness, appropriateness, and objectivity. Furthermore, it shows
why an environmental aesthetic based on categories derived from scientific knowledge is
not the only useful aesthetic for environmental protectionism.
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Conclusion:

There is both a descriptive and normative sense in which the scientific cognitive
model is not as comprehensive as some would lead us to believe. In being limited to
categories it fails to grasp the entirety of the aesthetic experience. It holds no exclusive
rights to engendering a certain depth and seriousness in the experience, and its claim to
objectivity is neither certain nor unique. In the descriptive sense the model is inadequate
in that it fails to capture the full aesthetic experience. There is also a normative
inadequacy in this regard, given that the aesthetic experience should be complete and not
neglect certain aspects that may still be considered appropriate. The general aesthetic
Carlson’s model strives for, one that treats an object as it actually is, or in the case of
nature, appreciates nature as nature, is also questionable. On the one hand, it is unclear as
to whether or not this is at all possible, while on the other hand it seems that if such as
notion is achievable by science, it is surely achievable by other means. There are some
inherent flaws of the scientific cognitive model itself, and the neutrality of scientific
knowledge should have us question why the model should serve as the only viable
foundation for an extension to ethics. I have argued that it should not be, but rather
should be incorporated into the model of constrained pluralism that Hettinger envisions.
In addition to scientific knowledge, emotion and imagination can inform a
significant part of the aesthetic experience. Carroll and Brady’s models should not be
thought to replace Carlson’s, but rather exist along-side it. In some cases, value can be
ascribed to a particular landscape through an emotional or imaginative response that
normally would have been absent by strictly relying on scientific knowledge. Scientific
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knowledge may render us indifferent to a particular landscape, while an emotional
response to it can enable an ascription of value that may have otherwise been absent. This
value can, of course, go on to inform our environmental decision making, providing an
additional rationale for protection or restoration. We should have no reason for thinking
this rationale less meaningful or arbitrary, given that it not only offers a certain depth in
the experience, but that this depth is open to objective cognitive appraisal.
There seems to be just as little guidance offered with emotional and imaginative
responses in the extension to environmental decision making, and so the value of the
beauty produced by these other aesthetic approaches still needs to be compared to other
values, such as ecological health. The value of beauty can function as a motivating force
for environmentalism, but when it comes to actual environmental decisions, its role is
secondary. I have already suggested why Eaton’s strategy of equating health and beauty
doesn’t work, and because beauty can and should be thought of as a separate value, the
means with which it is acquired seem to matter less than its actual realization. This is not
to suggest that any aesthetic response will do, as some are more informed and serious
than others. I wish only to suggest that the scientific cognitive model, with its own
problems and limitations, should be accompanied by other appropriate models in order to
achieve a more complete aesthetic. The more comprehensive aesthetic found in
Hettinger’s pluralism will not only enable aesthetics to do more work for ethics, but will
give us a deeper and more complete aesthetic experience in our own appreciation of
nature.
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